Blog For Arizona

Bush Goes to Work on Iran

You would think the Bush Administration would be embarrassed to use the same ham-fisted diplomatic methods to make war against Iran as they used for Iraq. Bald-faced lies about the regime’s intentions and capabilities, supported only by undisclosed classified information, seconded by very shady opposition groups. Pushing for technical violations of treaty and/or UNSC resolution violations to bring the matter before the Security Council and obtain a fig leaf of concurrence from the UN for armed intervention. How many times are we supposed to fall for this schtick?

Powell apparently thinks he has some credibility left, as he leveled a completely unsubstantiated charge at the Iranians that they are deceiving the UN, seeking nuclear weapons, and modifying ballistic missiles to carry them. His only support came from a terrorist organization, the National Council for Resistance, which is banned in the US. So again the claim that a regime is attempting to hide it’s facilities from the world becomes a proxy for, and proof of, an intent to assemble nuclear weapons, which is used in proxy of the actual possession of nuclear weapons, and reason for supposing both the means and intent to use them on the US. Doesn’t this seem somehow familiar?

The noise and fuss is an attempt by the Bush Administration to get the IAEA to refer any violations of Iran’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the UN Security Council. The hope is that sanctions and consequences can be won there which would lead to a pretext for military action – to take our Iran’s nuclear facilities, if not take down the regime. But El Baradei instead confirmed there were no violations of the NPT and affirmed the temporary and voluntary ‘confidence building’ freeze negotiated by several EU members seeking to defuse the American rhetoric and institute some permanent agreement that would allow the Iranians to proceed without further harassment.

Iran has actually been very open and transparent about its facilities for nuclear power, disclosing facilities and equipment for which disclosure was not required. The centrifuges that Washington is currently throwing a wobbly over are in this class of research facilities that needn’t be disclosed. Iran did not ‘hide’ anything from the world; this equipment was simply none of the world’s business. It seems that pesky concept of sovereignty is too troublesome for the Bush Administration to understand, except as it applies to the US and its asserted right to attack anyone who makes Bush nervous. So, even as the IAEA gives Iran a clean bill of health, the US reserves the right to take a treaty breach issue to the UNSC over the head of the monitoring agency set up by the treaty. A spokesperson for the Administration said, "Any member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council any situation that might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." This is rather like the schoolyard bully reporting Poindexter to the Principal for violation of the school’s ‘no bullying’ policy because he is inciting bullying by playing with his sliderule.

Iran maintains that they have no intent to develop nuclear weapons, I don’t dismiss this contention out of hand, nor accept it at face value. Any nation in Iran’s geo-strategic position, regardless of their diplomatic relations with the US, or form of self-governance, would have strong incentives to obtain nuclear weapons. I think it likely that Iran does want to have the ability to create nuclear weapons on short notice, or even to maintain a strategic ambiguity as to whether they possess them; much like Israel. But it is also possible that their claims are true, verifiable, and able to be accepted by the world community with sufficient confidence building and monitoring.

The rub lies in the confluence of technologies to manufacture enriched uranium for fuel, for nuclear weapons. Both activities look very much the same. If a nation builds the domestic capability for the ‘front end’ of the nuclear fuel cycle (mining, conversion, enrichment, and fabrication) for production of peaceful nuclear energy, a right granted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then they are only a step away from being able to build a nuclear weapon. The final steps can be so unobtrusive and hidden that it is really just a matter of political will that prevents a nation in Iran’s position from proceeding with a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA estimates that at least 40 nations are in precisely such a situation. Again, one has to question the motives for singling out Iran for special treatment in this group, and if our limited resources and diplomatic goodwill wouldn’t be better spent on higher-order threats.

Instead of relying on harassment and bluster and lies, perhaps addressing Iran’s underlying security concerns would be more effective in containing the possibility of Iranian leadership feeling the need for nuclear weapons as part of its strategic posture. Negative incentives are simply going to further embattle a regime that already feels itself hemmed in on all sides by American forces. Our history in Iran is not one to be proud of, and one which gives Iranians justifiable suspicion of our aims in seeking to constrain their internal affairs. Unfortunately, Americans have elected a tone-deaf Administration in a time of great tension in the region and great vulnerabilities in our military posture when a cultivated ear is needed to detect the overtures to peace amid what is sure to be strong and belligerent rhetoric from the Iranian regime.


Addendum, 11/30/04, 1:17am: I want to emphasize that the option of military pre-emption is only a tactic to put off the problem of Iran's supposed nuclear weapon capacity to a later date. Striking known nuclear-related targets in Iran will not end any possible treat. Indeed, in many ways it makes that potential threat all the more certain, even as it delays Iran's possible plans by some months or years. Even the nearly impossible option of regime change in Iran only delays Iran's nuclear development. It assumes that future Iranian regimes would be controllable by Washington, even if 'friendly', and that an allied Iranian government would have no incentives to pursue dual use nuclear technologies, or even nuclear weapons. Further, even entertaining the regime change option assumes Iranian retaliation for such an operation would come at an acceptable cost to our mission in Iraq, which is highly dependent upon the tolerance of Iran. Iran could easily make our presence in Iraq much more costly, and even untenable, by inciting and supporting the Shi'ite majority in armed rebellion, rather than using their influence to induce predominant tolerance of our occupation in the expectation of a dominant political role for Shi'ites in a post occupation government.

There is no good military solution to the challenge of Iranian nuclear development. Using political, financial, and diplomatic resources is likely to produce equal or superior security guarantees at much lower cost than military options. Unfortunately, non-violent options also carry a potentially unacceptable domestic political risk of appearing weak or of engaging in appeasement of a hostile regime. Whether Bush is willing to tolerate a risk of trouble within his base to increase the chances of success in Iraq, and Iran, is the main political calculus that will determine US foriegn policy toward Iran over the next four years: the early signs are not favorable.

posted by Michael Bryan @ 11/29/2004 09:27:00 PM