Monday, September 20, 2004

Lowered Expectations In Iraq

What are going to do about Iraq? It is a question that generates blank stares and head shaking from people who know what is going on, and rose-colored scenes of democracy and free-market utopia from those who do not. What might we reasonably expect over the next few years from our involvement in Iraq? What might a realistic exit strategy look like under Bush or Kerry? What is the worst case scenario? These are questions that should have been illuminated by this Presidential campaign, but for a variety of reasons, have not yet been addressed by the candidates. Both Bush and Kerry continue to promise easy solutions, or simply propose to hold course until we go over that cliff clearly visible ahead. Perhaps that will change in this final stretch of the campaign. Kerry has signaled an intent to bring the Iraq issue to bear more forcefully than in the past. Whatever the future holds, dealing with the consequences of our involvement in Iraq will not be easy, and it will not look anything like any scenario either candidate is willing to admit.

Military leaders and analysts not blinkered by partisan sentiments now recognize that Iraq is already lost, or at least in grave danger of being lost. The insurrection has grown so large (estimates hover around 100K) that it cannot be defeated by military means. But even that figure is misleading. It is not just 100K Iraqis who want American forces to leave; it is most Iraqis. Nor is it a matter of bringing to heel 100K guerrilla fighters; the insurrection has the popular support to renew, or even expand, its numbers despite any losses we can inflict upon it short of outright genocide. A political solution is the only strategy that can possibly end the bloodshed, and it will not come in the form dubious elections in January. Kofi Annan recently pronounced the occupation of Iraq illegal under international law. Such a judgment by the Secretary General is not binding, but delegitimates any elections in the eyes of an already hostile international community. Bush’s planned Iraqi elections, in which only hand-picked parties and candidate will be allow ed to participate, will not serve as convincing exit strategy if they are even able to be held at all. What do our possible exit strategies look like? If you just want a conclusion as to Bush’s and Kerry’s strategies in Iraq, skip to the last five paragraphs now.

To understand where we are going, we must have a clear view of where we have been. It would require a book to fully describe what has led us to where we are in Iraq. A few paragraphs will necessarily be a poor portrait.

What the Administration aimed for by invading and occupying Iraq was a subservient new regime with just enough legitimacy to be tolerated by the international community and enough power to give Iraqis little choice in the matter. To that end, a handful of political opportunists willing to exchange the self-determination of their nation for personal power were to be installed via elections which would be closed to any who would not accept the continued presence of US forces and a special relationship with the US. The product of this political engineering was to be a new Iraq completely open to foreign capital and trade, with the key policy decisions regarding oil, foreign policy, and defense controlled via Washington. Oil revenues would boost the Iraqi military budget, building an Iraqi armed forces dedicated to stabilizing the region in concert with US forces. In essence, Iraq would play the military role of Iran under the Shah, an imperial vassal state vastly lucrative to international capital. Meanwhile, the vast untapped potential of Iraqi oil reserves would be tapped, giving the US immense influence over some of the largest reserves on earth. Iraq would become a major bulwark of American influence in the Middle East and means of bringing Middle Eastern governments into line in our fight against political factions in their countries capable of executing terrorist attacks on Western nations.

From a nihilistically power-hungry way, it was a bold and audacious plan. So where did everything go wrong? The Administration overreached. The Neo-Con ideologues of the Pentagon civilian leadership hadn’t any realistic idea of the limits of armed force, or any feel for conditions in the Middle East in general, or Iraq, in particular. Had the Neo-Cons been content with a standard-issue puppet government, they would have succeeded in the imperialist designs, as they did in Haiti recently, and as America has in so many other nations for the past century. In fact, the Neo-Cons could likely have bought a stable Ba’athist regime under new leadership that was once again friendly to US interests without firing a shot. But they wanted it all, and they needed an excuse. Those they have used, WMD, serving democracy, and the toppling of a corrupt regime which brutalized its own people, left no room for accommodation with the existing government.

The ideologue free-traders in the Administration wanted to remake the Iraqi government, and the economy, too. They would be able to hand out incredible largess to corporate contributors and line their own pockets after leaving office with an entire nation at their disposal. But to remake the Iraqi economy, it first had to be killed. The reconstruction was intentionally starved of capital, the Iraqi economy was allowed to idle in the belief that the newly freed markets the Provisional Authority had created would cause the Iraqi economy to bloom as international corporations moved in to buy up assets at firesale prices and restart production. It never happened, and the thousands of soldiers thrown out of work by disbanding the army, and the thousands of workers idled by the largely unnecessary destruction of the invasion and attendant looting now found themselves destitute, desperate, and angry. The seeds of the insurrection were planted by the Administration’s own ideological follies.

Faced with guerrilla attacks and an increasingly hostile populace, US forces frequently over reacted. American forces were not trained for, nor intended for, prolonged occupation duty. They treated the population as hostiles by default, and the result was an egregious number of civilian casualties. Combined with the unforgivable torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, our own actions have increasingly turned the average Iraqi against any continued American presence. If some Iraqis did not resent American intervention in their country following the Gulf War, more than decade of crushing sanctions, and a completely unprovoked invasion and occupation, our actions as occupiers have more than done the job of turning any goodwill to hatred.

That brings us back to our increasingly untenable occupation of Iraq as it now stands. Having loosened the hold of Baghdad on the country, the occupation has also radicalized politics by making the most obstreperous and militant political factions central to Iraqi nationalism and identity. The end result may well be the ultimate breakup of Iraq into ethically and theologically more homogenous parts and likely civil war in the process. The antagonism of the main factions, Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, and Kurds, will be a continuous challenge in brokering any political settlement that might yet save Iraq from civil war and a free-for-all for political supremacy in Iraq. Already a heterogeneous set of rebel factions hold de facto control of several cities and towns in the Sunni triangle, large portions of the Iraqi countryside, and parts of Baghdad itself. The Kurdish area is under complete control of the Peshmerga forces, tolerating a token American presence, and continuing allegiance to the Iraqi state on suffrage. At this point America forces truly control only the ground they stand on and the major military installations. It will not be long before the Green Zone housing the unelected puppet government of Allawi is under mortar fire, as it was this weekend, on a regular or constant basis.

How do we extract ourselves from this? Bush can’t do it. Bush won’t even admit reality. The idea of staying the course will result in ever increasing Iraqi and American casualties until we have our own Dien Bien Phu. American puissance at arms cannot change the inevitable outcome of a motivated, well-supported, well-equipped national resistance. Kerry pins his hopes on bringing in more international partners. But few national leaders would be charitable enough to place their citizens in a shooting gallery to help us save face and withdraw with honor and leave them holding a sackful of vipers. No, it is politically impossible for either candidate to say what he will actually do in Iraq. It is up to us to deduce their policy goals and from that, their actual plans of action.

Bush is easy. He cannot afford to be defeated in Iraq if his party wants to retain power. He and his allies in the GOP have invested too much political capital to back down to the Iraqi liberation movement, and his backers have invested to much financial capital in Bush’s promise to deliver an Iraqi free market. Bush must press on and hope for the best. That way lies the decimation of our military, a (very selective) draft, military escalation, a possible spread of the conflict to Syria and/or Iran, increasing levels of disaffection with the war effort, the rapid squeezing out of social spending from the Federal budget, spiraling debt, escalating political unrest and violence at home, and a humiliating, military and diplomatic defeat following the death of yet more American men and women and thousands more innocent Iraqis. This is a clearly an immoral and unacceptable option. Voting for Bush is voting for a massacre and another American humiliation worse even than Vietnam.

Kerry’s course is more difficult to chart. His desire to internationalize not just the military presence of the occupation, but give full participation to international partners hints at his plan. No major power is going to be lured into Iraq by the promise of a slice of the mercantile pie alone. Were that possible, Bush would have already suceeded in buying Russian and Indian troops he has bargained for. I believe that Kerry will enter into negotiations with the major rebel and ethnic factions in Iraq in hopes of striking a cease-fire in return for a rapid American withdrawal. Only then would he stand a chance internationalizing and/or localizing the security forces, and they are likely to be a token peacekeeping force. The deal will be contingent upon open elections with full political participation by all parties, including religious factions.

Kerry has no major political investment in restricting the possible membership and control of the new government, nor in ensuring an open Iraqi market. Both will become bargaining chips with which Kerry will purchase a dignified retreat. He can even claim to have brought peace and democracy to Iraq. Such political solution may install a religious regime, but it will face a diversity of opposition and a de facto federalized nation, so the inclusion of Iraqi Shi’ite religious leaders will not hurt Kerry too much, those most likely to be offended by the development will already despise him. Kerry might press for a new Constitution with more political protections for minorities, but he will likely be content to allow Iraqi politics to evolve naturally so long as they agree to arms control measures and promise to fight terrorism. We will lose the Bush Administration’s pipe dream of a compliant and friendly Iraq, but in time Iraqi interests may realign with our own. Just because Iraq is not our tool, does not mean it must be our enemy.

Of course, Kerry could not possibly win the Presidency by saying to the American people, "I will allow a fundamentalist Islamic state to come to power in Iraq, if that is what it takes to get us out of Iraq," in the current political environment. He will maintain the fiction that military victory is a viable possibility in Iraq until election day. To do otherwise in this political environment is asking to be pilloried. The reason why Kerry is so unconvincing on the Iraq issue, is almost certainly because he is dissembling. I wish it didn’t have to be so, but the necessity must be clear to all by now. America is the grip of a pre-fascist hysteria, now is hardly the time to remonstrate with the American people. It is time to take back power and lead them away from the flame of self-immolation. Only then can the truth be told to all in the knowledge that the ‘button’ no longer in the hands of moral monster. I'm interested to see what Kerry's new approach to Iraq will be through the debates, but I doubt it will stray far from criticizing specifice decisions. Kerry is not likely to be too specific about what happens after inauguration day besides promising an exit before his second inauguration.

The possibility of a secular Iraqi state was mortally wounded with the Ba’ath party was outlawed and the Ba’athist army was disbanded. Kerry must play the hand dealt him in the only way it realistically can be played. In the wake of Bush’s provocation and empowerment of the most atavistic factions of Iraqi politics, Kerry’s only trick is to accede to Iraqi self-determination. The greatest difficulty facing Kerry if he takes such a course is to prevent Iran from exploiting Iraqi politics and creating another radicalized, anti-American fundamentalist Shi’ite state in Iraq. This will be one of the a major tests of his Presidency. Sadly, many of Kerry’s major tests as President will be setting aright what Bush has broken.

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